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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the employment effects of the November 2015 minimum wage
increase in Johnson County, Iowa from $7.25 per hour to $8.25 per hour. It was the first of
three incremental minimum wage increases implemented by the county to raise its minimum
wage to $10.10 per hour. The paper uses a difference-in-difference approach to compare the
experience of the Johnson County labor market with that of contiguous border counties to
estimate the impact of the policy change. The study’s results yielded employment comparison
estimates which were not statistically significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the policy
effect of the minimum wage hike on employment is zero cannot be rejected.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In September 2015, Johnson County (Iowa) voted to increase its minimum wage ahead of the
current federal and state minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. The stated intention of the policy is
to respond to the difficulties faced by low-wage workers given local economic conditions.
(Board of Supervisors). However, the policy may also cause many low-wage workers to lose
their jobs due to the increased cost to business of hiring and employing minimum wage workers.
Johnson County is the only county in Iowa which has moved to increase its minimum wage.
This discrepancy creates a research opportunity to analyze the employment effects of the
minimum wage increase against contiguous Iowa counties who remain at the state-level
minimum wage.
The minimum wage hike in Johnson County was implemented in three steps. The first step
happened on November 1, 2015 and it raised the minimum wage to $8.25 per hour. On May 1,
2016, a second step raised the minimum wage to $9.15 per hours. The final step happened on
January 1, 2017 and it raised the minimum wage to $10.10 per hour. On July 1, 2018 and on
each July 1 thereafter, the ordinance will raise the minimum wage incrementally to reflect the
Consumer Price Index for the Midwest region as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
There were some local exceptions to the Johnson County minimum wage ordinance to note.
The towns of Solon, Swisher, Shueyville, and Oxford opted out of the minimum wage hike.
However, the combined population of these towns is only 4,606 people, which amounts to 3.3%
of the county’s population. Also, the town of Tiffin raised its minimum wage to a lower amount
than the rest of the county. It went to a minimum wage of $9 per hour as of March 2016.
1

However, the population of Tiffin is also very small accounting for only 1.7% of the county’s
population. The combined effect of these exceptions is assumed to be very small for the
purposes of this study.
The question of whether to raise the minimum wage in Iowa is significant because other
Iowa counties have either passed or are also considering minimum wage increases. Polk county
(which includes the Des Moines metro area) (Meinch 2016), Linn county (which includes the
Cedar Rapids metro area) (Schmidt 2016), and Wapello county (N 2016) have already passed
proposals to increase the local minimum wage. Linn County implemented its increase January 1,
2016. Polk is scheduled to implement its increase on April 1, 2017. Wapello County plans to
raise its minimum wage on January 1, 2018. Lee County is moving toward an implementation of
a minimum wage hike (N 2017) and Black Hawk County is reviewing the matter (Jamison
2017).
Linn and Polk counties contain the two biggest population centers in the state. A
minimum wage change in both of those counties would impact a significant portion of Iowa’s
citizens.
Furthermore, there is some political momentum within Iowa toward the adoption of a
state-wide minimum wage increase. Recent poll results show that around seven in 10 Iowans
favor an increase in the state's current minimum wage (Hardy 2016). The Iowa Senate passed a
bill to raise the state’s minimum wage in 2015, but it was later voted down by the Iowa House of
Representatives (Hanson 2015).
The minimum wage issue could have a significant policy impact on the state economy.
Proponents of a minimum wage increase cite the improvement in the well-being of low wage
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households along with benefits for the local business community. Estimates suggest that raising
Iowa’s minimum wage to $10.10 per hour state-wide would boost the incomes of around
306,000 Iowans (around 10% of the population), with the biggest impact coming to low-income
households (Cooper 2013). The potential GDP impact of workers’ increased earnings is
estimated to be as high as $272 million for the state of Iowa (Cooper 2013). However, critics
point to the possibility of negative employment effects which could come with an increase in the
cost of low-wage labor.
This study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, it adds to the existing
literature of minimum wage studies using the rigorous methodology of control group
comparison. This is a relatively new and emerging development in this field of minimum wage
research. Second, it represents a more recent study of the impact of the minimum wage specific
to the state of Iowa. The last published study on the employment effects of the minimum wage
in Iowa was published in 2002 (Orazem & Mattila 2002). Finally, it would use the experience of
the Johnson county minimum wage increase to inform policymakers and citizens of the
employment impact of such an increase elsewhere in the state.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will review the literature of minimum wage
studies done to address the research question. Section 3 will discuss minimum wage theory and
how it relates to this study. Section 4 will cover the design of the study used in this paper.
Section 5 will discuss the dataset used for this study. Section 6 will deliver the empirical results
from the models. Section 7 will provide a conclusion to the paper.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The minimum wage in the United States is set at the national, state, and local levels.
Currently, the federal government sets a minimum standard for hourly wages at $7.25 per hour.
However, many state and local jurisdictions set a higher minimum wage than the national
standard. The differences in minimum wage standards established by different layers of
government provide researchers ample opportunities to examine the employment effects of the
policy.
The method of fixed effects modelling was extended to study local level data to study the
impact of minimum wage changes on specific affected groups such as teenagers and least-skilled
workers. Neumark and Wascher (1996), Neumark (2001), Burhauser et al (2000a&b) and many
others soon utilized the fixed-effects modeling framework to individual-level data to understand
the impact of the minimum wage on specific vulnerable groups. The results of these studies
generally reflected negative employment effects to the specified groups because of a higher
minimum wage.
Neumark and Wascher (2007) performed an exhaustive review of 102 minimum-wage
studies. In this review, they highlighted a group of 33 studies that they perceived as providing
the most credible evidence on the employment effects of the minimum wage. Of the group of 33
studies, they point out that 28 of them (85 percent) estimate negative employment effects. Most
of the studies within this subset fall into the category of state and individual-level fixed-effects
models.
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A key divide in the minimum wage literature is along methodological lines. The
differences in study design methods may be responsible for much of the variance in results. One
type of methodology compares cases involving an increase in the minimum wage against a
similar control group. Studies using this methodology generally find that minimum-wage
increases have little or no effect on employment. Another type of methodology tends to run a
fixed effects model on employment levels to estimate how employment changes after states
enact a higher minimum wage. It does not compare against a similar control group, but uses
controls and fixed effects in a regression model. Studies using this methodology tend to find that
minimum-wage increases produce a negative impact on employment.
Fixed effect models on the employment effects of the minimum wage typically use panel
data on employment levels at the state and local levels to examine the effect of a minimum wage
increase. They control for stable differences between observations which do not vary over time.
Such models rely on differences in the minimum wage among localities to determine the effect
of the policy.
David Neumark and William Wascher have emerged as leaders in the application of fixed
effect models to study the employment effects of increases to the minimum wage. Their 1992
paper estimated that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage reduced teenage employment by
1 to 2 percent and young adult employment by 1.5 to 2 percent. They followed that up over
more than two decades with numerous studies and literature reviews on the issue of the
minimum wage. Their work tends to focus on short-term negative employment effects of a
minimum wage increase. They also argue that the impact is particularly severe on the youngest
unskilled workers who suffer lasting damage because they are denied entry into formal paid
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labor. They also assert that minimum wages are poorly targeted policy and not a particularly
useful tool to lower poverty (Neumark and Wascher 2008).
A landmark case study was done by Card and Krueger (1994) on an increase in New
Jersey’s state minimum wage from $4.25 to $5.05. The study used comparable restaurants in
Pennsylvania (which did not increase the minimum wage) immediately across the border from
New Jersey as a control group. The Card and Krueger study concluded that the minimum wage
increase in New Jersey did not reduce employment in that state relative to the control group of
Pennsylvania restaurants.
Card and Krueger’s approach of using control group comparisons was subsequently used
by many researchers with more sophistication and improved data sources. A significant example
of this was done by Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010). Rather than focusing on a particular
locality, these researchers compared every pair of neighboring counties with a minimum wage
difference along every state border in the country over the course of a 16-year span. This study
found no adverse employment effects from an increase in the minimum wage. Furthermore, the
findings are robust allowing for long-term effects of minimum wage changes due to the extended
time span covered by the study. Given the wide sampling of data drawn for the study and the
control group methodology, this study offers estimates which are representative of a typical
minimum wage increase rather than one specific to a particular labor market.
Many other studies using control group comparisons yielded similar results. Dube,
Lester, and Reich (2013) used the same cross-border methodology to analyze the effect on teens
and found no significant impact on their employment. Dube and Zipperer (2014) confirm these
findings using a “synthetic control group approach”. Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2009,
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2012) found no evidence of job loss in the retail or restaurant sectors once they accounted for
trends in sectoral employment.
While most minimum wage studies using control group comparisons find no negative
employment effects, there are a small minority which do. For example, Sabia, Burkhauser, and
Hansen (2012) compared New York state with several comparison states, and found negative
employment effects. Singell and Terborg (2007) found negative effects associated with much
larger increases in the minimum wage in Oregon and Washington compared to California, Idaho,
and Nevada. Finally, Neumark, Salas, and Wascher (2013) use a “synthetic control method”
which uses methods that let the data identify the appropriate control groups and find negative
minimum-wage employment effects.
However, each of these studies carry significant flaws. Hoffman (2014) found that the
negative effect found in the Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen study was found only in a subset of
their data source and not when applied to the full Current Population Survey. More to the point,
each of these aforementioned studies use state-wide data rather than data from localized control
groups to make their comparisons. By doing so, they fail to account for the heterogeneity which
exists between local labor markets. While these studies did use control group comparisons to
estimate their conclusions, their control groups were weak in comparison to studies like Dube,
Lester, and Reich (2010) which use adjacent counties rather than states.
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CHAPTER 3
MINIMUM WAGE THEORY & PREDICTION
The effect of a minimum wage on employment has been studied extensively by many
researchers. However, despite the large volume of research made in this area, there remains no
clear consensus on the employment effects of a change in the minimum wage. Much of this is
likely due to differences in empirical study design. This section of the paper will review the
literature of minimum wage studies as they relate to employment effects and discuss how
differences in empirical study designs can influence results.
There are many possible explanations for the lack of substantial negative employment
effects from an increase in the minimum wage in many labor markets. One possibility is that
some employers possess monopsony power in their local market. Monopsony is similar in many
ways to monopoly as a market structure, except that the influence of market power exists on the
buyer side of the market rather than on the seller side. If labor markets are monopsonistic,
employers can use their bargaining power to pay a wage lower than workers’ marginal product.
In such a case, the implementation of a minimum wage can increase employment and efficiency
if it is set at a point between the monopsony wage and the marginal product of labor (Leonard
2000).
Another possibility is that employers may respond to increases in minimum wage rates in
ways other than job cuts. Employers may compensate for higher wage rates in alternate ways
such as price increases or productivity improvements rather than letting minimum wage workers
go.
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Finally, an increase in the minimum wage may operate as an efficiency wage in a local
labor market. Minimum wage labor markets tend to be characterized by high rates of turnover
which creates extra costs related to hiring and training workers. Efficiency wages are wages paid
at a rate higher than the market clearing price to increase productivity or reduce labor cost related
to worker turnover. If the minimum wage serves as an efficiency wage in a job market, a higher
wage rate can be offset by reduced labor costs of hiring and replacing workers due to lower
turnover rates. For example, Georgiadis (2008) estimated that higher wage costs due to an
increase in the UK minimum wage were more than offset by lower monitoring costs, and
concluded that the wage increase may have acted as an efficiency wage.
It is important to bear in mind that the lack of negative employment effects found in
many of the national minimum wage studies may be subject to some variation locally. For
example, the landmark minimum wage study done by Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) analyzes
377 U.S. border counties over a 16-year span. It shows that the distribution of employment
elasticities from individual case studies is largely centered on zero. However, the paper also
concludes that the probability of obtaining individual results which are large is not trivial. This
result establishes the importance of pooling across individual case studies to obtain a more
reliable estimate. While a typical labor market may not encounter significant job losses from an
increase in the minimum wage, a specific local labor market may experience such effects. The
authors also note that the possible effect of such large individual estimates can be positive as
well as negative. For the local labor markets where this condition may hold, an increase in the
minimum wage would deliver positive employment effects to the community.
It is important to note that conclusions which can be drawn from minimum wage research
about the employment effects of a hypothetical minimum-wage increase are limited by the scope
9

of previous studied increases. For example, Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) caution in their
national minimum wage study that their “results cannot be extrapolated to predict the impact of a
minimum-wage increase that is much larger than what we have experienced over the period
under study.” University of Kentucky’s Center for Poverty Research publishes a state-level
panel data series covering population, employment, unemployment, welfare, poverty, and
politics for the period spanning from 1980 to 2014. One of the variables it tracks is the
minimum wage. Almost all the effective one-year minimum wage increases described in this
dataset were 15 percent or lower. Furthermore, periodic increases in the federal minimum wage
have tended to range between around 20 percent and 45 percent in multiple steps (Cooper 2013).
Given the scope of previous minimum wage increases, caution should be exercised when
considering minimum wage increases which exceed historical norms established in minimum
wage research.
Based on the current stage of research, Arindrajit Dube (2014) suggests that setting the
state and local minimum wages close to half the median full-time wage is a good gauge for
policy. He also proposes states and localities should consider the local cost of living when setting
minimum wage policy and should index wage levels for inflation. Adoption of such a policy
would offer a target in line with U.S. experiences in the 1960s and 1970s as well as that of other
advanced industrialized nations. The adoption of such a policy could raise the wage floor for
many minimum wage workers in the United States while still respecting local economic
conditions and minimizing the probability of negative employment effects.
The adoption of a minimum wage increase could deliver substantial economic benefits to
minimum wage workers as well as to the macroeconomy potentially. For example, Dale Cooper
published a paper quantifying the economic impact of a minimum wage increase bill sponsored
10

by Patty Murray (D-Wash.) and Rep. Robert “Bobby” Scott (D-Va.) named the Raise the Wage
Act of 2015. The bill that would have raised the federal minimum wage in five steps to $12 per
hour by 2020. This analysis estimates that such a change would have either directly or indirectly
raised the wages of 35.1 million workers, who would have received about $80 billion in
additional wages over the phase-in period. This would deliver a raise of about $2,300 per year to
the average minimum wage worker (assuming no change in hours worked). While such an
approach may have delivered negative employment effects to some specific labor markets where
the cost of living is low, the analysis does illustrate the substantial gains such a policy could
potentially deliver to low-wage workers overall.
Dale Belman of Michigan State University and Paul Wolfson of the Tuck School of
Business at Dartmouth compiled a very comprehensive evaluation of minimum wage research in
their 2014 book “What Does the Minimum Wage Do?”. The book won the William G Bowen
award for Outstanding Book on Labor and Public Policy in 2014. Their work synthesizes more
than 200 scholarly publications published since 1991 (most after 2000) that study the various
impacts of raising the minimum wage. Based on their analysis, the authors conclude the
following: “Evidence leads us to conclude that moderate increases in the minimum wage are a
useful means of raising wages in the lower part of the wage distribution that has little or no effect
on employment and hours. This is what one seeks in a policy tool, solid benefits with small costs.
That said, current research does not speak to whether the same results would hold for large
increases in the minimum wage.”
Based on current minimum wage theory and the empirical results of recent studies, the
research hypothesis for this study holds that the employment effects from the minimum wage
increase will not be strong. There are several reasons why an increase in the minimum wage
11

might not lead to significant employment losses among low-wage workers. One rationale for
this is that the labor market may push toward an efficiency wage equilibrium. Furthermore,
employers may respond by passing along some of the cost to consumers in the form of price
increases or by raising the productivity of their business processes. Finally, businesses may have
difficulty cutting back on employment if there is an increase in the demand for the goods and
services they deliver to the local community. The increase in local consumer demand may be
brought about due to spending increases related to the higher minimum wage.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY DESIGN
An issue with many fixed-effects models which study the minimum wage is that they
implicitly compare every state which raises the minimum wage coequally with every state which
does not. This potentially introduces the issue of selection bias into the model. States that
“select” into a higher minimum wage are often significantly different from those which do not.
Fixed effects models could potentially control for this problem if they have data which
accounts for these differences and if these factors do not change over time. However, if these
factors are not effectively accounted for, then a given fixed effects model will deliver biased
estimates of the effect of the minimum wage. Giotis and Chletsos (2015) conducted a review of
64 U.S. studies and found that once selection bias is accounted for and corrected, little or no
evidence of a negative association between minimum wages and employment remains.
States in the U.S. with larger minimum wages tend to have systematically different labor
market characteristics which are mostly unrelated to minimum wage policy. They tend to be
regionally clustered and possess different political economy characteristics. States in the
Northeast, in parts of the Midwest, and in the Pacific regions are much more likely to have high
state minimum wages, while states in the Southeast and the Mountain regions are much less
likely to possess them (Allegretto, Dube, Reich, & Zipperer 2013).
High minimum wage states tend to withstand more severe economic downturns,
experience sharper reductions in routine task intensive jobs, and sustain faster growth in upperhalf wage inequality. Furthermore, intrastate heterogeneity exists between local labor markets of
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different geographical areas. These differences affect low-wage labor demand and the resulting
heterogeneity must be accounted for in the model (Allegretto, Dube, Reich, & Zipperer 2013).
This suggests that heterogeneity between geographic areas can be properly accounted for
in minimum wage models by using comparisons within local areas. Using local area controls
avoids the problem of structural differences between labor markets. This assumption presumes
that neighboring control groups are very similar in terms of key covariates.
Minimum wage studies which use control group comparisons tend to deliver more
reliable estimates than fixed effects models using panel data. Aside from addressing the issue of
selection bias which is present in fixed effect models, the construction of credible control groups
in comparison models also reduces the possibility of bias from omitted variables or reverse
causality.
Matching cases of minimum-wage increases to a proper control group is important
because it is the closest a study can get to the ideal of a random assignment experiment (Kuehn
2014). Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) listed five major categories of empirical evaluation
methods: social experiments, natural experiments, matching methods, instrumental variables,
discontinuity design, and control functions. They do not discuss state-level fixed effect models
as a valid empirical evaluation method. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) mentioned fixed-effects
models as a more archaic tool for empirical evaluation, and clarified that these were used before
new insights were developed requiring fewer functional form and homogeneity assumptions.
Minimum wage studies using well-matched control group comparisons offer a stronger study
design than fixed effect models using panel data.
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The design of this proposed study would follow the border discontinuity approach
suggested by Allegretto, Dube, Reich, & Zipperer (2013). This method exploits a policy
discontinuity between contiguous bordering geographic areas to estimate treatment effects. It
assumes that the inherent similarities of neighboring areas used for the treatment and control
groups offer good controls for heterogeneity in the model. This approach offers a way of
constructing credible control groups which reduces the possibility of bias from omitted variable
or reverse causality. Matching cases of minimum-wage increases to a proper control group is
important because it is the closest a study can get to the ideal of a random assignment experiment
(Kuehn 2014). The similarity of covariates between the control groups minimizes the possibility
of identification problems due to omitted variables or reverse causality. The nature of the
potential data source (employer-reported government data) also makes the prospect of
measurement error unlikely. The Johnson County minimum wage increase provides a natural
experiment from which a study with a high degree of internal validity is possible.
The study will use the technique of difference in differences to estimate the treatment
effect of the minimum wage increase against the outcomes of a control group. This method
assumes that the treatment group and control group have similar characteristics and are trending
in the same way over time. The difference between the groups is that the treatment group is
affected by the policy change while the control group is not. By comparing the outcomes of the
two groups, the effect of the policy treatment on the treated group can be estimated.
The difference in differences method helps control for differences between the treatment
and control groups which may exist even after controlling for observed outcomes. Rather than
measuring the outcomes of the independent variables, this estimator compares the change in
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outcomes pre- and post-treatment. By doing so, it adjusts for any unobserved remaining
differences which may possibly exist between the groups (Stock & Watson 2015).
The use of local area controls in this study assumes that neighboring control groups are
very similar in terms of key covariates. Since the outcomes of the Johnson County labor market
are compared with the outcomes of other local labor markets in surrounding counties, the study
design seeks to mitigate the possibility of selection bias in its estimates.
For this paper, I estimate the following model:
=

0

+

+

1

2

f

+ [σt] + [τc] + [ ]+

where subscript i stands for industry, subscript c stands for county, and subscript t stands for
time. The term yict is the dependent variable including wage and employment. The coefficient
0

is of particular interest as it estimates the employment effect of the policy change on the

treatment group versus that on the control group. The term [σt] represents a time fixed effect,
[τc] was used for county fixed effect, and [ ] represents an industry fixed effect. The term

is

an error term.
The treatment group for the initial difference in difference regression is restaurants and
bars in Johnson County. Specifically, this includes all establishments which are identified by the
7224 NAICS code (“Drinking places, alcoholic beverages”) and the 7225 NAICS code
(“Restaurants and other eating places”). These industry groups were chosen for the treatment
group because they are labor-intensive enterprises whose workers are minimum wage intensive.
To further test this research question, an expanded treatment group was also formed. The
purpose of this was to expand the reach of the treatment group to capture the experiences of
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other minimum wage workers in Johnson County. While restaurants and bars tend to be very
minimum wage intensive, there are many minimum wage workers employed in other industries.
The expanded treatment group includes eight industry codes with the lowest weekly wage
levels in the county as measured before the policy intervention. It was defined to include all
industries below the threshold level of $15,080 for annualized weekly wages. That figure is the
annual income a hypothetical worker would receive for 40 hours of work per week at the $7.25
minimum wage.
The expanded treatment group includes the following industry codes:
•

NAICS 7224 Drinking places, alcoholic beverages

•

NAICS 7225 Restaurants and other eating places

•

NAICS 8141 Private households

•

NAICS 7139 Other amusement and recreation industries

•

NAICS 6116 Other schools and instruction

•

NAICS 6244 Child day care services

•

NAICS 4531 Florists

•

NAICS 4481 Clothing stores

For the sake of further comparison, an "expanded" control group was also defined. The
expanded control group includes eight industry codes with the highest weekly wage levels in the
county as measured before the policy intervention.
The reasoning behind the formation of this group is to prevent the inclusion of workers
employed to minimum wage positions even if they work in an industry which is not minimum
wage intensive. Through the application of a more selective standard to the expanded control
17

group, the chance of unintentionally including a minimum wage worker is reduced. The intent is
to identify the industries least likely to be affect by the minimum wage policy change to compare
them against those which are most likely to be affected by the minimum wage change.
The expanded control group includes the following industry codes:
•

NAICS 4251 Electronic markets and agents and brokers

•

NAICS 5231 Securities and commodity contracts brokerage

•

NAICS 5415 Computer systems design and related services

•

NAICS 5611 Office administrative services

•

NAICS 5413 Architectural and engineering services

•

NAICS 5511 Management of companies and enterprises

•

NAICS 5112 Software publishers

•

NAICS 6211 Offices of physicians

To check the robustness of the difference-in-difference method, a falsification test was
employed. This test re-estimates the difference-in-difference model over a time period in the
dataset prior to the policy intervention. The model makes the implicit assumption that the
treatment effect happened well before the actual policy change. By doing so, the falsification
test seeks to identify a “placebo” treatment effect where none should exist. Since the implicit
placebo treatment precedes the actual policy intervention, the difference-in-difference estimator
should be statistically insignificant and small.
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CHAPTER 5
DATA
The data source for this study is the Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages (QCEW). It provides county-level payroll data by detailed industry on
a quarterly basis. The data set is based on business filings to calculate payroll taxes related to
unemployment insurance. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, it covers 97.2% of
American workers constituting virtual census of employees on nonfarm payrolls (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics). Because the QCEW is based on official government documentation built from
information submitted from the businesses themselves, the data can be considered highly reliable
and accurate.
The dataset built from the QCEW includes variables on the number of establishments,
employment, average weekly wage, and total quarterly wages. The data for each variable is
broken down by industry to the 4-digit NAICS code level for each county. While the
employment figures reported in the QCEW are monthly totals, the information on the number of
establishments, average weekly wage, and total quarterly wages are quarterly numbers. To
maintain consistency in the database, the quarterly figures were converted to monthly numbers
by averaging them out over each of the months in the quarter.
The dataset includes information from Johnson County along with the surrounding
counties of Linn, Cedar, Muscatine, Louisa, Iowa, and Washington. Since the minimum wage
was raised only in Johnson County, the data from the surrounding counties provides an
opportunity to contrast groups who did not experience a minimum wage rate hike against those
who did.
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Due to the limited amount of data released by the QCEW at the time of writing, this
paper will focus on the effect of the first wage increase which occurred in November 2015.
Given the date of the policy intervention, the “before” period is defined at the months between
January 2014 and October 2015. The “after” period is defined as the months between November
2015 and May 2016. Taken together, these groups represent 30 distinct time periods for
estimation. The number of time periods involved in the study should sufficiently capture the
before and after effects of the policy intervention as well as trends between the treatment and
control groups.
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CHAPTER 6
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Subsection: Benchmark Regressions:
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for the treatment and control groups
within and outside of Johnson County.
Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Treatment & Control Groups
Variable
Number of establishments: Mean
Number of establishments: Std. Dev.
Employment: Mean
Employment: Std. Dev
Average weekly wage: Mean
Average weekly wage: Std. Dev
Avg. total wage (monthly): Mean
Avg. total wage (monthly): Std. Dev
Observations

Johnson County
Treatment
Control
170.1
27.71
128.6
30.32
3583
313
2975.3
417
$239.80
$756.62
30.42
373.47
$4,069,373
$960,725
3530654
1407363
60

3426

Non-Johnson County
Treatment
Control
91.69
25.85
120.67
38.65
1691
325
2595
691
$222.11
$756.17
38.82
442.77
$1,885,621
$1,064,501
3010801
2397030
303

12876

In an average month, Johnson County maintained 170.1 restaurants and bars and employed 3,583
workers in those establishments. The average weekly wage for a worker in the treatment group
was $239.80 per week. The businesses in the control group averaged 27.71 employers per
industry and hired 313 workers per industry. The wage of the average worker in the control
group was $756.62 per week.
Table 1 also shows the means and standard deviations for the treatment and control
groups for the surrounding counties around Johnson County. The surrounding counties
maintained 91.69 restaurants and bars and employed 1,691 workers in an average month. The
average weekly wage for a worker in that group was $222.11 per week. There was also an
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average of 25.85 non-restaurants/bars in the surrounding counties which employed an average of
325 workers in each industry. The average wage of a worker in this group was $756.17 per week.
Table 2 shows the regression results of the difference in difference comparison of
Johnson County restaurants and bars versus all other industry groups.
Table 2: Regression Results for Restaurant Treatment Group
(1)
(2)
Difference in Difference
-176.56
-176.56
(324.07)
(324.42)
Policy Change
6.42
25.50
(10.81)
(43.56)
Treatment Group
1450.02***
1449.97***
(178.13)
(178.32)
Constant

290.61***
274.84***
(5.49)
(30.02)
Monthly Fixed Effect
No
Yes
County Fixed Effect
No
No
Industry Fixed Effect
No
No
Observations
12876
12876
Adjusted R-sq.
0.094
0.092
The dependent variable in equation (1), (2), (3), & (4) is employment
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

(3)
-153.98
(305.64)
27.16
(39.85)
1515.93***
(169.14)

(4)
-152.82
(268.78)
34.64
(31.37)
2317.13***
(209.68)

326.22***
(28.68)
Yes
Yes
No
12876
0.237

475.52***
(31.11)
Yes
Yes
Yes
12876
0.532

Explanatory variables were added to the regression equation to control for the unobserved
heterogeneity specific to each factor. A monthly time fixed effect was used to mediate the
influence of seasonality in the equation. Fixed effects for differences in county and industry
were also added to the model to control for differences in these areas.
Adding the time fixed effects to the model yielded an estimated outcome of 176.56 jobs
lost due to the policy. When county fixed effects were included to the equation, the regression
estimates a job loss of 153.97 jobs. When time, county, and industry fixed effects are each
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considered in the regression, it estimates that 152.81 jobs were lost due to the policy
intervention.
The adjusted r-squared increased from 0.094 when no fixed effects were considered to
0.532 when all fixed effects were included in the regression. However, none of the regression
models with the restaurant treatment group yielded estimates which are significant at the 10%
level.
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the treatment group’s weekly average wage before
and after the policy change.
Table 3: Average Weekly Wages for Treatment Group Before and After Policy Change
Treatment Group
Control Group
Variable
Before
After
Before
After
Average Weekly Wage: Mean
$221.17 $224.40
$1,005.42
$1,047.71
Average Weekly Wage: Std. Dev.
37.73
41.50
780.42
824.05
Minimum Figure
138
142
63
49
Maximum Figure
309
301
3784
3938
Observations
215
88
1227
444

The treatment group experienced only a small increase in average weekly wage from
$221.17 before the policy intervention to $224.40 after it happened. While the minimum
outcome for average weekly wage rose from $138 to $142 after the ordinance was implemented,
the maximum number dropped from $309 to $301.
Table 4 shows regression results for treatment effects on average weekly wages from the
policy intervention.
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Table 4: Average Weekly Wage Regression Results for Restaurant/Bar Treatment Group
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Difference in Difference
-45.6000
-43.8617
-1.5514
-49.7855
(88.4844)
(88.8844)
(95.7799)
(42.8745)
Treatment Group
-785.3002*** -787.0385***
-787.8574***
-1849.8382***
(37.2777)
(37.5578)
(41.4142)
(60.7902)
Policy Change
41.1023
58.7411
68.7943
63.6888*
(87.9278)
(93.2283)
(90.4380)
(38.0174)
Constant
1008.3888*** 1062.8447***
995.6084***
2033.8706***
(37.0328)
(67.7550)
(76.7105)
(64.1849)
Time Fixed Effect
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
County Fixed Effect
No
No
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effect
No
No
No
Yes
N
658
658
658
adj. R-sq
0.130
0.128
0.164
The dependent variable in equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) is average weekly wages
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

658
0.852

The models in Table 4 estimate that the treatment group experienced lower wages
relative to the control group even once the minimum wage hike was implemented. Model (1)
estimates that average weekly wages for the treatment group were $45.60 lower than those
experienced by the control group. Model (2) includes a time fixed effect and estimates an
average weekly wage loss of $43.86 for the treatment group. Model (3) adds both time and
county fixed effects to the model and it estimates average weekly wages were lower by $1.55 for
the treatment group. Model (4) includes time, county, and industry effects and estimates an
average weekly wage loss of $49.79 relative to the control group.
The adjusted r-squared increased from 0.130 when no fixed effects were considered to
0.852 when all fixed effects were included in the regression. However, none of the regression
models with the restaurant treatment group yielded estimates which are significant at the 10%
level.
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The possible reasons for a decline in average weekly wages for despite the
implementation of a minimum wage hike are unclear from the information available in this
dataset. It could be speculated that employers may have reacted to the higher wage by reducing
the number of hours worked. Also, many of the workers at restaurants and bars rely on tips from
customers as part of their wage. It is possible that consumers may have responded to the policy
change by leaving lower tips for tipped employees. Ultimately, the outcome remains that the
estimated treatment effect of the policy intervention on average weekly wages was too small to
be statistically significant.
Subsection: With Expanded Treatment/Comparison:
Table 5 shows the means and standard deviations for the treatment and control groups for
the expanded treatment group in Johnson County along with those for businesses outside the
treatment group in the county.
Table 5: Means and Standard Deviations of Original and Expanded Treatment Groups
Variable
Treatment
Expanded Treatment
Number of establishments: Mean
170.1
87.7
Number of establishments: Std. Dev.
128.6
92.25
Employment: Mean
3583
1229
Employment: Std. Dev
2975.3
2047
Average weekly wage: Mean
$239.80
$262.15
Average weekly wage: Std. Dev
30.42
53.97
Avg. total wage (monthly): Mean
$4,069,373
$1,404,462
Avg. total wage (monthly): Std. Dev
3530654
2386488
Observations

60

3426

In a typical month, the average industry in the expanded treatment group included 87.73
establishments employing 1,229 workers. The average weekly wage for a worker in the
expanded treatment group was $262.15. By comparison, the original treatment group included
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170.1 restaurants and bars and employed 3,583 workers in those establishments. The average
weekly wage for a worker in the treatment group was $239.80 per week.
Table 6 shows the regression results of the difference in difference comparison of the
expanded treatment group versus all other industry groups.
Table 6: Regression Results for Expanded Treatment Group
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
Difference in Difference
-18.16
-18.27
-7.40
(53.85)
(53.91)
(50.85)
Policy Change
7.47
26.77
27.89
(11.72)
(45.56)
(42.07)
Treatment Group
145.34***
145.44***
182.1494***
(28.67)
(28.71)
(27.75)
Constant
303.14***
287.00***
338.67***
(5.97)
(31.46)
(30.74)
Monthly Fixed Effect
No
Yes
Yes
County Fixed Effect
No
No
Yes
Industry Fixed Effect
No
No
No
Observations
12876
12876
12876
adj. R-sq
0.010
0.008
0.150
The dependent variable in equation (1), (2), (3), & (4) is employment
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

(4)
-35.07
(43.00)
34.18
(31.07)
-743.3613***
(95.80)
424.64***
(28.92)
Yes
Yes
Yes
12876
0.547

The regression equation estimates that the expanded treatment group lost 18.16 jobs
relative to the control group due to the implementation of the minimum wage hike. Adding the
time fixed effects to the model yielded an estimated outcome of 18.26 jobs lost due to the policy.
When county fixed effects were included to the equation, the regression estimates a job loss of
7.40 jobs. When time, county, and industry fixed effects are each considered in the regression, it
estimates that 35.07 jobs were lost due to the policy intervention.
The adjusted r-squared increased from 0.010 when no fixed effects were considered to
0.547 when all fixed effects were included in the regression. However, as was the case with the
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restaurant treatment group, none of the regression models with the expanded treatment group
yielded estimates which are significant at the 10% level.
Table 7 compares the summary statistics of the expanded control group with those of the
expanded treatment group.
Table 7: Summary Statistics for Expanded Treatment/Control Group Before & After Policy Change
Expanded
Treatment
Expanded Control
Variable
Before
After
Before
After
Employment: Mean
1228
1232
322
340
Employment: Std. Dev.
2033
2103
453
482
Minimum Figure: Employment
23
15
4
5
Maximum Figure: Employment
6850
6765
2051
2098
Average Weekly Wage: Mean
$254.34 $284.19
$1,606.66
$1,684.05
Average Weekly Wage: Std. Dev.
53.86
48.24
511.60
556.48
Minimum Figure: Avg. Weekly Wage
166
208
837
977
Maximum Figure: Avg. Weekly Wage
409
415
3784
3938
687
246
Number of Observations
175
62

The expanded treatment group showed an increase in mean employment from 1228
before the policy change to 1232 after it was implemented. The minimum outcome for
employment declined from 23 to 15 after the minimum wage hike, and the maximum number
also decreased from 6850 to 6765.
The expanded treatment group experienced a substantial increase in average weekly wage
from $254.34 before the policy intervention to $284.19 post-implementation. The minimum
outcome for average weekly wage rose from $166 to $208 after the ordinance was implemented,
and the maximum number also increased from $409 to $415.
The expanded control group showed an increase in mean employment from 322 before
the policy change to 340 after it was implemented. The minimum outcome for employment
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increase from 4 to 5 after the minimum wage hike, and the maximum number also increased
from 2051 to 2098.
The expanded treatment group experienced a substantial increase in average weekly wage
from $1606.66 before the policy intervention to $1684.05 after the change. The minimum
outcome for average weekly wage rose from $837 to $977 after the ordinance was implemented,
and the maximum number also increased from $3784 to $3938.
Table 8 shows the regression results for the expanded treatment group against and the
expanded control group.
Table 8: Regression Results for Expanded Treatment Group vs. Expanded Control Group
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Difference in Difference
-23.51
-23.71
2.68
-31.50
(55.58)
(56.00)
(51.23)
(43.61)
Policy Change
18.09
50.70
57.38
35.26
(49.95)
(200.97)
(186.64)
(138.50)
Treatment Group
85.45***
85.60***
180.69***
-807.70***
(29.42)
(29.68)
(30.72)
(98.12)
Constant
415.07***
387.48***
636.22***
340.81***
(24.89)
(137.96)
(142.26)
(96.28)
Monthly Fixed Effect
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
County Fixed Effect
No
No
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effect
No
No
No
Yes
Observations
1974
1974
1974
1974
adj. R-sq
0.002
-0.012
0.122
0.514
The dependent variable in equations (1), (2), (3) & (4) is employment
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

Regression equation (1) in Table 8 estimates that the expanded treatment group lost 23.51
jobs relative to the expanded control group due to the implementation of the minimum wage
hike. Regression equation (2) in Table 8 adds time fixed effects to the regression equation. By
this estimation, the expanded treatment group lost 23.71 jobs relative to the expanded control
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group due to the policy change. Regression equation (3) includes time and fixed effects in the
equation and estimates 2.68 jobs gained from the intervention. Regression equation (4) includes
all three fixed effects and estimates 31.50 jobs lost from the minimum wage hike.
The adjusted r-squared increased from 0.002 when no fixed effects were considered to
0.514 when all fixed effects were included in the regression. However, as was the case with the
other permutations, none of the models regressing the expanded treatment group against the
expanded control group yielded estimates which are significant at the 10% level.
Table 9 shows regression results for treatment effects on average weekly wages from the
policy intervention on the expanded treatment group.
Table 9: Weekly Wage Regression Results for Expanded Treatment Group
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Difference in Difference
-36.27
-36.04
-35.85
-39.17
(42.70)
(42.84)
(39.57)
(32.10)
Treatment Group
-696.65***
-696.88***
-759.17***
-304.13***
(16.80)
(16.78)
(18.21)
(46.26)
Policy Change
75.72
88.10
87.76
92.64
(80.57)
(82.65)
(74.53)
(59.34)
Constant
1537.46*** 1584.34*** 1257.32***
1900.26***
(31.67)
(44.28)
(43.06)
(74.70)
Time Fixed Effect
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
County Fixed Effect
No
No
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effect
No
No
No
Yes
N
658
658
658
658
adj. R-sq
0.707
0.707
0.787
0.860
The dependent variable in equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) is average weekly wages
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

The models in Table 9 estimate that the expanded treatment group experienced lower
wages relative to the expanded control group after the policy intervention happened. Model (1)
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estimates that average weekly wages for the treatment group were $36.27 lower than those
experienced by the control group. Model (2) includes a time fixed effect and estimates an
average weekly wage loss of $36.04 for the treatment group. Model (3) adds both time and
county fixed effects to the model and it estimates average weekly wages were lower by $35.85
for the treatment group. Model (4) includes time, county, and industry effects and estimates an
average weekly wage loss of $39.17 relative to the control group.
The adjusted r-squared increased from 0.707 when no fixed effects were considered to
0.860 when all fixed effects were included in the regression. However, none of the regression
models with the expanded treatment group yielded estimates which are significant at the 10%
level.
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Subsection: Falsification Test Results
Table 10 shows the regression results for the falsification test made for employment on
the restaurant/bar treatment group and the expanded treatment group.
Table 10: Falsification Test for Employment

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-82.83

-83.16

-65.90

-50.56

16.56

16.48

2.88

-42.60

(585.66)

(587.33)

(530.94)

(454.24)

(58.98)

(59.45)

(54.84)

(45.91)

1482.09***

1482.64***

1577.70***

2432.20***

76.29*

76.48*

179.03***

794.31***

(418.29)

(419.45)

(385.46)

(425.17)

(43.05)

(43.40)

(43.34)

(112.71)

1.93

1.74

6.17

-2.09

-15.30

17.65

47.32

33.47

(36.85)

(37.01)

(37.00)

(34.45)

(50.16)

(204.32)

(190.57)

(141.01)

273.96***

265.33***

560.79***

694.43***

423.69***

396.32***

640.59***

320.74***

(25.80)

(87.21)

(120.37)

(121.83)

(37.56)

(137.11)

(146.00)

(95.69)

Time Fixed
Effect

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

County Fixed
Effect

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Industry
Fixed Effect

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Observations

524

524

524

524

1442

1442

1442

1442

0.185

0.180

0.316

0.486

0.002

-0.011

0.118

0.520

Diff in Diff
Treatment
Group

Policy
Change
Constant

adj. R-sq

The dependent variable in equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) & (8) is employment
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

The falsification test results shown in Table 10 estimate a difference-in-difference
outcome which is small relative to the employment variable. Models (1), (2), (3), and (4)
estimate difference-in-difference models for the restaurant/bar treatment group. The estimates
declined in size even when explanatory fixed effects variables were added. The model with no
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fixed effect estimated a job loss of 82.83 jobs, while the model which controlled for all fixed
effects estimated a job loss of 50.56 jobs.
In table 10, models (5), (6), (7) and (8) estimate the difference-in-difference outcomes for
the expanded treatment group. The model with no fixed effect estimated a job gain of 16.56 for
the treatment group relative to the control group, while model (8) which controlled for all fixed
effects estimated a job loss of 42.60.
Each of the models estimated in the table were statistically insignificant. This reinforces
the notion that the model did not register a placebo treatment effect in the pre-implementation
period where one did not exist.
Table 11 shows the regression results for the falsification test made for average weekly
wages on the expanded treatment group.
Table 11: Falsification Test for Weekly Wages
Diff in Diff
Treatment
Group
Policy
Change

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-35.85

-36.61

-9.78

-15.42

-24.34

-24.97

-19.55

-22.04

(74.59)

(74.94)

(77.31)

(36.22)

(20.61)

(20.65)

(19.72)

(16.39)

-767.28***

-768.83***

-788.00***

-1774.27***

-681.74***

-681.65***

-745.83***

-283.53***

(53.16)

(53.56)

(55.98)

(64.89)

(15.44)

(15.45)

(15.80)

(33.68)

44.29

45.38

52.51

21.72

57.21

71.92

62.32

62.35

(62.9970)
Constant
Time Fixed
Effect
County Fixed
Effect
Industry
Fixed Effect
Observations

986.00***

1040.31***

979.77***

1963.40***

1500.22***

1519.67***

1201.46***

1793.41***

(52.83)

(78.59)

(87.67)

(69.68)

(29.16)

(53.60)

(46.15)

(54.43)

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

524

524

524

524

adj. R-sq
0.129
0.126
0.157
0.854
The dependent variable in equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) is average weekly wages
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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1442

1442

1442

1442

0.709

0.707

0.787

0.861

The falsification test results shown in Table 11 estimate a difference-in-difference
outcome which is small. Models (1), (2), (3), and (4) estimate difference-in-difference models
for the restaurant/bar treatment group. The model with no fixed effect estimated an average
weekly wage loss of $35.85, while model (4) which controlled for all fixed effects estimated a
job loss $15.42.
In Table 10, models (5), (6), (7) and (8) estimate the difference-in-difference outcomes
for the expanded treatment group with regard to average weekly wages. The model with no
fixed effect estimated an average weekly wage loss of $24.35, while model (8) which controlled
for all fixed effects estimated a wage loss $22.04.
Each of the models estimated in both Table 10 and Table 11 were statistically
insignificant. This outcome supports the assumption of the robustness of the models since it did
not register a placebo treatment effect for either employment or average weekly wages in the
pre-treatment period.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
None of the difference-in-difference regressions employed in this paper yielded estimates
which are statistically significant. Therefore, based on these results, the null hypothesis that the
policy effect of the minimum wage hike on employment in Johnson County is zero cannot be
rejected. There may have been some effect of the policy intervention on employment, but these
estimates show that the impact, if it is non-zero, is too small to be statistically significant.
This outcome is consistent with the empirical results of many recent studies which tend to
find that minimum-wage increases have little or no effect on employment. Such studies typically
match labor markets experiencing an increase in the minimum wage with an appropriate
comparison labor market to control for heterogeneity in the model.
It should be noted that Johnson County is home to the University of Iowa in Iowa City.
The university has an enrollment of just over 30,000 students per year. Many of the students are
likely potential additions to the local minimum wage labor pool and thus may have some effect
on local labor market conditions. However, many empirical studies in non-college towns also
report similar results to those estimated in this study. Research suggests that the appropriate
minimum wage depends strongly on local labor market conditions and the cost of living.
One caveat to the findings of this study is that it applies only to the first step of Johnson
County’s minimum wage ordinance. Two other minimum wage hikes were also implemented in
the county: a raise to $9.15 in May 2016 and an increase to $10.10 in January 2017. It is
possible that the effect of those minimum wage hikes on employment in Johnson County were
different than those estimated in this paper.
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Another caveat is that a minimum wage hike is more likely to significantly affect
employment at higher wage levels. The minimum wage increase estimated in this paper could be
described as a moderate increase relative to local economic conditions. One should not assume
that a higher minimum wage has little effect on employment conditions at all wage levels. At
higher relative wage levels, an increase in the minimum wage is more likely to affect
employment levels among lower-wage workers.
Nevertheless, the conclusion that moderate increases in the minimum wage produce little
effect on employment is noteworthy. It suggests that increases in the minimum wage can be
used as means to effectively raise wages for low wage workers with little cost to society in the
form of employment losses. Much of the wage increases paid to this group are likely to be respent in the local economy. To the extent that this outcome is beneficial to society, a modest
minimum wage increase can produce significant marginal benefits at little marginal cost.
Linn and Polk counties in Iowa have passed minimum wage increases in their local labor
markets. Both of those counties are fairly similar to Johnson County demographically. Each has
a metro area somewhat larger than the Iowa City metro area located in Johnson county. The
Cedar Rapids (Linn) and Des Moines (Polk) metro areas are measurably larger than Iowa City.
Based on the results of this paper and the similarity of those labor markets, it is likely that Linn
and Polk counties will also be able to absorb moderate minimum wage increases at little cost to
employment.
Wapello county has also passed a minimum wage increase at the time of this writing but
has not implemented it yet. Wapello county is a smaller and more rural county with a lower
wage base and a much smaller metro area. Furthermore, the main population center for the
county (Ottumwa) has opted out of the local ordinance (Sussmann 2016). Because of these
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differences, it should not assume similar outcomes to those experienced in Johnson county.
Given the dissimilarity of its labor market relative to Johnson county, caution should be
employed regarding the question of a policy to increase its minimum wage.
The minimum wage remains a contentious issue in Iowa. On March 30, 2017, Governor
Terry Branstad signed legislation into law which removes local control over wage issues
(Gruber-Miller 2017). This law effectively renders local minimum wage ordinances like those in
Johnson County void and unenforceable. Nevertheless, a local campaign has begun to encourage
employers to keep the minimum wage stable at the current $10.10 per hour rate. Many local
employers have publicly expressed a willingness to maintain current wage levels for existing
employees, suggesting that local minimum wages may be sticky for some time despite the
passage of the state law abolishing local wage controls (Gruber-Miller 2017).
While local control of wage issues has been abolished in Iowa for the time being, the
minimum wage issue still promises to be a provocative issue in Iowa. The experience of
Johnson County, along with that of Linn County, has raised the expectations of many workers
about the definition of a reasonable wage. Johnson County’s experience of raising the minimum
wage from November 2015 through March 2017 will be instructive and enlightening in future
policy discussions of the issue.
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